The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems.
1. Protect device security. In other words, prevent a device from being used to conduct attacks, including participating in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against other organizations, and eavesdropping on network traffic or compromising other devices on the same network segment. This goal applies to all IoT devices.
2. Protect data security. Protect the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of data (including personally identifiable information [PII] ) collected by, stored on, processed by, or transmitted to or from the IoT device. This goal applies to each IoT device except those without any data that needs protection.
3. Protect individuals' privacy. Protect individuals' privacy impacted by PII processing beyond risks managed through device and data security protection. This goal applies to all IoT devices that process PII or that directly or indirectly impact individuals.
Each goal builds on the previous goal and does not replace it or negate the need for it. Meeting each of the risk mitigation goals involves addressing a set of risk mitigation areas. Each risk mitigation area defines an aspect of cybersecurity or privacy risk mitigation thought to be most significantly or unexpectedly affected for IoT by the risk considerations. For each risk mitigation area, there are one or more expectations organizations usually have for how conventional IT devices help mitigate cybersecurity and privacy risks for the area. Finally, there are one or more challenges that IoT devices may pose to each expectation. The figure below depicts the end result of these linkages, which is the identification of a structured set of potential challenges with mitigating cybersecurity and privacy risk for IoT devices that can each be traced back to the relevant risk considerations.
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Organizations should ensure they are addressing the cybersecurity and privacy risk considerations and challenges throughout the IoT device lifecycle for the appropriate risk mitigation goals and areas. This publication provides the following recommendations for accomplishing this:
1. Understand the IoT device risk considerations and the challenges they may cause to mitigating cybersecurity and privacy risks for IoT devices in the appropriate risk mitigation areas.
2. Adjust organizational policies and processes to address the cybersecurity and privacy risk mitigation challenges throughout the IoT device lifecycle. This publication cites many examples of possible challenges, but each organization will need to customize these to take into account its mission requirements and other organizationspecific characteristics.
3. Implement updated mitigation practices for the organization's IoT devices as you would any other changes to practices. The publication provides insights to inform organizations' risk management processes. After reading this publication, an organization should be able to improve the quality of its risk assessments for IoT devices and its response to the identified risk through the lens of cybersecurity and privacy. However, this does not mean cybersecurity and privacy risks for an IoT device can all be addressed within the device itself. Every IoT device operates within a broader IoT environment where it interacts with other IoT and non-IoT devices, cloud-based services, people, and other components.
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For some IoT devices, additional types of risks, including safety, reliability, and resiliency, need to be managed simultaneously with cybersecurity and privacy risks because of the effects addressing one type of risk can have on others. Only cybersecurity and privacy risks are in scope for this publication. Readers who are particularly interested in better understanding other types of risks and their relationship to cybersecurity and privacy may benefit from reading NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-82 Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, which provides an operational technology (OT) perspective on cybersecurity and privacy. [3] Readers do not need a technical understanding of IoT device composition and capabilities, but a basic understanding of cybersecurity and privacy principles is expected.
Publication Structure
The remainder of this publication is organized into the following major sections and appendices:
• Section 2 defines capabilities IoT devices can provide that are of primary interest in terms of potentially affecting cybersecurity and privacy risk.
• Section 3 describes considerations that may affect the management of cybersecurity and privacy risks for IoT devices.
• Section 4 explores how the risk considerations may affect mitigating cybersecurity and privacy risk for IoT devices. The section lists expectations for how these risks are mitigated in conventional IT environments, then explains how IoT presents challenges to those expectations and what the potential implications of those challenges are.
• Section 5 provides recommendations for organizations on how to address the cybersecurity and privacy risk mitigation challenges for their IoT devices.
• Appendix A previously held examples of possible cybersecurity and privacy capabilities that organizations may want their IoT devices to have. That content has been removed from this publication and will be refined and released in a separate publication.
• Appendix B provides an acronym and abbreviation list.
• Appendix C contains a glossary of selected terms used in the publication.
• Appendix D lists the references for the publication. Figure 1 depicts the topics covered in each section and subsection of this publication.
Figure 1: Topics Covered in This Publication IoT Device Capabilities
Each IoT device provides capabilities-features or functions-it can use on its own or in conjunction with other IoT and non-IoT devices to achieve one or more goals. This publication references the following types of capabilities IoT devices can provide that are of primary interest in terms of potentially affecting cybersecurity and privacy risk differently than conventional IT devices. This is not a comprehensive list of all possible IoT device capabilities.
• Transducer capabilities interact with the physical world and serve as the edge between digital and physical environments. Transducer capabilities provide the ability for computing devices to interact directly with physical entities of interest. Every IoT device has at least one transducer capability. The two types of transducer capabilities are:
o Sensing: the ability to provide an observation of an aspect of the physical world in the form of measurement data. Examples include temperature measurement, radiographic imaging, optical sensing, and audio sensing.
o Actuating: the ability to change something in the physical world. Examples of actuating capabilities include heating coils, cardiac electric shock delivery, electronic door locks, unmanned aerial vehicle operation, servo motors, and robotic arms.
• Interface capabilities enable device interactions (e.g., device-to-device communications, human-to-device communications). The types of interface capabilities are:
o Application interface: the ability for other computing devices to communicate with an IoT device through an IoT device application. An example of an application interface capability is an application programming interface (API).
o Human user interface: the ability for an IoT device and people to communicate directly with each other. Examples of human user interface capabilities include touch screens, haptic devices, microphones, cameras, and speakers.
o Network interface: the ability to interface with a communication network for the purpose of communicating data to or from an IoT device-in other words, to use a communication network. A network interface capability includes both hardware and software (e.g., a network interface card or chip and the software implementation of the networking protocol that uses the card or chip). Examples of network interface capabilities include Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Long-Term Evolution (LTE), and ZigBee. Every IoT device has at least one enabled network interface capability and may have more than one.
• Supporting capabilities provide functionality that supports the other IoT capabilities. Examples are device management, cybersecurity, and privacy capabilities. [2] Figure 2 summarizes these IoT device capabilities.
Cybersecurity and Privacy Risk Considerations
Cybersecurity risk and privacy risk are related but distinct concepts. Risk is defined in NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2 as "a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact, or magnitude of harm, that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence." [4] For cybersecurity, risk is about threats-the exploitation of vulnerabilities by threat actors to compromise device or data confidentiality, integrity, or availability. For privacy, risk is about problematic data actions-operations that process personally identifiable information (PII) through the information lifecycle to meet mission or business needs of an organization or "authorized" PII processing and, as a side effect, cause individuals to experience some type of problem(s). As Figure 3 depicts, privacy and cybersecurity risk overlap with respect to concerns about the cybersecurity of PII, but there are also privacy concerns without implications for cybersecurity, and cybersecurity concerns without implications for privacy.
[5] IoT devices generally face the same types of cybersecurity and privacy risks as conventional IT devices, though the prevalence and severity of such risks often differ. For example, data security risks are almost always a significant concern for conventional IT devices, but for some IoT devices, there may not be data security risks because they do not have any data that needs protection.
This section defines three cybersecurity and privacy risk considerations that may affect the management of cybersecurity and privacy risks for IoT devices. Organizations should ensure they are addressing these risk considerations throughout the lifecycle of their IoT devices. Section 4 provides more information on how these risk considerations may affect risk mitigation, and Section 5 provides recommendations for organizations on how to address the risk mitigation challenges.
Consideration 1: Device Interactions with the Physical World
Many IoT devices interact with the physical world in ways conventional IT devices usually do not.
The interactions with the physical world that IoT devices enable may affect cybersecurity and privacy risks in several ways. Here are examples:
• IoT sensor data, representing measurements of the physical world, always has uncertainties associated with it. Effective management of IoT sensor data, including understanding uncertainties, is necessary to assess data quality and meaning so the organization can make decisions regarding the data's use and avoid introducing new risks. Without this, error rates may be unknown for the different contexts in which an IoT device might be used. 1 Effective IoT sensor data management is important when mitigating physical attacks on sensor technology, such as attacks performed through wireless signals, that could cause sensors to produce false results.
• The ubiquity of IoT sensors in public and private environments can contribute to the aggregation and analysis of enormous amounts of data about individuals. These activities can be used to influence individuals' behavior or decision-making in ways they do not understand, or lead to information being revealed that individuals did not want revealed, including the re-identification of previously de-identified PII-and may be beyond the originally intended scope of the IoT device's operation.
• IoT devices with actuators have the ability to make changes to physical systems and thus affect the physical world. The potential impact of this needs to be explicitly recognized and addressed from cybersecurity and privacy perspectives. In a worst-case scenario, a compromise could allow an attacker to use an IoT device to endanger human safety, damage or destroy equipment and facilities, or cause major operational disruptions. Privacy concerns and related civil liberties concerns could arise through authorized changes to physical systems that could impact individuals' physical autonomy or behavior in personal and public spaces. For example, physical access controls, such as automated door locks, could be used to limit access to rooms or buildings with individuals inside, or environmental controls such as lighting or temperature could be used to influence individuals' movement in buildings.
• IoT network interfaces often enable remote access to physical systems that previously could only be accessed locally. Manufacturers, vendors, and other third parties may be able to use remote access to IoT devices for management, monitoring, maintenance, and troubleshooting purposes. This may put the physical systems accessible through the IoT devices at much greater risk of compromise. Further, these decentralized data processing functions can exacerbate some privacy risks, making it harder for individuals to understand how the IoT system is operating so that they can make informed decisions regarding the processing of their information and their interactions with the IoT system.
Another important aspect of IoT device interactions with the physical world is the operational requirements devices must meet in various environments and use cases. Many IoT devices must comply with stringent requirements for performance, reliability, resilience, safety, and other objectives. These requirements may be at odds with common cybersecurity and privacy practices for conventional IT. For example, practices such as automatic patching are generally considered essential for conventional IT, but these practices could have far greater negative impacts on some IoT devices with actuators, making critical services unavailable and endangering human safety. An organization might reasonably decide that patches should be installed at a date and time chosen by the organization with the appropriate staff onsite and ready to react immediately if a problem occurs. An organization might also reasonably decide to avoid patching certain IoT devices under normal circumstances and instead tightly restrict logical and physical access to them to prevent exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities.
Another way to think of this is in terms of general cybersecurity objectives: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For conventional IT devices, confidentiality often receives the most attention because of the value of data and the consequences of a breach of confidentiality. For many IoT devices, availability and integrity are more important than confidentiality because of the potential impact to the physical world. Imagine an IoT device that is critical for preventing damage to a facility. An attacker who can view the IoT device's stored or transmitted data might not gain any advantage or value from it, but an attacker who can alter the data might trigger a series of events that cause an incident.
Consideration 2: Device Access, Management, and Monitoring Features
Many IoT devices cannot be accessed, managed, or monitored in the same ways conventional IT devices can.
Conventional IT devices usually provide authorized people, processes, and devices with hardware and software access, management, and monitoring features. In other words, an authorized administrator, process, or device can directly access a conventional IT device's firmware, operating system, and applications, fully manage the device and its software throughout the device's lifecycle as needed, and monitor the internal characteristics and state of the device at all times. Authorized users can also access a restricted subset of the access, management, and monitoring features.
In contrast, many IoT devices are opaque, often referred to as "black boxes." They provide little or no visibility into their state and composition, including the identity of any external services and systems they interact with, and little or no access to and management of their software and configuration. The organization may not know what capabilities an IoT device can provide or is currently providing. In extreme cases, it may be difficult to determine if a black box product is actually an IoT device because of the lack of transparency.
Authorized people, processes, and devices may encounter one or more of the following challenges in accessing, managing, and monitoring IoT devices that affect cybersecurity and privacy risk:
• Lack of management features. Administrators may not be able to fully manage an IoT device's firmware, operating system, and applications throughout the IoT device's lifecycle. Unavailable features may include the ability to acquire, verify the integrity of, install, configure, store, retrieve, execute, terminate, remove, replace, update, and patch software. In addition, an IoT device's software may be automatically reconfigured when an adverse event occurs, such as a power failure or a loss of network connectivity.
• Lack of interfaces. Some IoT devices lack application and/or human user interfaces for device use and management. When such interfaces do exist, they may not provide the functionality usually offered by conventional IT devices. An example is the challenge in notifying users about an IoT device's processing of their PII so they can provide meaningful consent to this processing. An additional issue is the lack of universally accepted standards for IoT application interfaces, including expressing and formatting data, issuing commands, and otherwise fostering interoperability between IoT devices.
• Difficulties with management at scale. Most IoT devices do not support standardized mechanisms for centralized management, and the sheer number of IoT devices to be managed may be overwhelming.
• Wide variety of software to manage. There is extensive variety in the software used by IoT devices, including firmware, standard and real-time operating systems, and applications. This significantly complicates software management throughout the IoT device lifecycle, affecting such areas as configuration and patch management.
• Differing lifespan expectations. A manufacturer may intend for a particular IoT device to only be used for a few years and then discarded. An organization purchasing that device might want to use it for a longer time, but the manufacturer may stop supporting the device (e.g., releasing patches for known vulnerabilities) either by choice or because of supply chain limitations (e.g., supplier no longer releases patches for a particular IoT device component). The problem of differing lifespan expectations is not new and is not specific to IoT, but it may be particularly important for some IoT devices because of safety, reliability, and other risks potentially involved in using devices past their intended lifespan.
• Unserviceable hardware. IoT device hardware may not be serviceable, meaning it cannot be repaired, customized, or inspected internally.
• Lack of inventory capabilities. IoT devices brought into an organization may not be inventoried, registered, and otherwise provisioned via the normal IT processes. This is especially true for types of devices that did not previously have networking capabilities.
• Heterogeneous ownership. There is often heterogeneous ownership of IoT devices. For example, an IoT device may transfer data to manufacturer-provided cloud-based service processing and storage. Data may also be sent to a cloud service to aggregate data from multiple IoT devices in a single location. These cloud services may have access to portions or all of the devices' data, or even access to and control of the devices themselves for monitoring, maintenance, and troubleshooting purposes. In some cases, only manufacturers have the authority to do maintenance; an organization attempting to install patches or do other maintenance tasks on an IoT device may void the warranty. Also, in IoT there may be little or no information available about device ownership, especially in black box IoT devices. This could exacerbate existing privacy redress difficulties because the lack of accountability limits individuals' abilities to locate the source of and correct or delete information about themselves, or to address other problems. Another concern with heterogeneous ownership is the effect on device reprovisioning-what data may still be available after transferring control of a device.
Consideration 3: Cybersecurity and Privacy Capability Availability, Efficiency, and Effectiveness
The availability, efficiency, and effectiveness of cybersecurity and privacy capabilities are often different for IoT devices than conventional IT devices.
For the purposes of this publication, built-in cybersecurity and privacy capabilities are called pre-market capabilities. Pre-market capabilities are integrated into IoT devices by the manufacturer or vendor before they are shipped to customer organizations. Post-market capabilities are those capabilities that organizations select, acquire, and deploy themselves in addition to pre-market capabilities. Pre-market and post-market cybersecurity and privacy capabilities are often different for IoT devices than conventional IT. The main reasons for this are:
• Many IoT devices do not or cannot support the range of cybersecurity and privacy capabilities typically built into conventional IT devices. For example, a "black box" IoT device may not log its cybersecurity and privacy events or may not give organizations access to its logs. If pre-market capabilities are available for IoT devices, they may be inadequate in terms of strength or performance-e.g., using strong encryption and mutual authentication to protect communications may cause unacceptable delays. 2 Post-market capabilities cannot be installed onto many IoT devices. Also, existing pre-market and post-market capabilities may not be able to scale to meet the needs of IoT-for example, an existing network-based cybersecurity appliance for conventional IT devices may not be able to also process the volume of network traffic and generated data from a large number of IoT devices.
• The level of effort needed to manage, monitor, and maintain pre-market capabilities on each IoT device may be excessive. Especially when IoT devices do not support centralized management, it may be more efficient to implement and use centralized postmarket capabilities that help protect numerous IoT devices instead of trying to achieve the equivalent level of protection on each individual IoT device. One example is having a single network-based IoT gateway or IoT security gateway protecting many IoT devices instead of having to design, manage, and maintain a unique set of protection capabilities within each IoT device.
• Some post-market capabilities for conventional IT, such as network-based intrusion prevention systems, antimalware servers, and firewalls, may not be as effective at 
Challenges with Cybersecurity and Privacy Risk Mitigation for IoT Devices
Cybersecurity and privacy risks for IoT devices can be thought of in terms of three high-level risk mitigation goals, as shown in Figure 4: 1. Protect device security. In other words, prevent a device from being used to conduct attacks, including participating in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against other organizations, and eavesdropping on network traffic or compromising other devices on the same network segment. This goal applies to all IoT devices.
2. Protect data security. Protect the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of data (including PII) collected by, stored on, processed by, or transmitted to or from the IoT device. This goal applies to each IoT device except those without any data that needs protection.
Each goal builds on the previous goal and does not replace it or negate the need for it. Meeting each of the risk mitigation goals involves addressing a set of risk mitigation areas, which are defined below. Each risk mitigation area defines an aspect of cybersecurity or privacy risk mitigation thought to be most significantly or unexpectedly affected for IoT by the risk considerations defined in Section 3.
Risk mitigation areas for Goal 1, Protect Device Security:
• Asset Management: Maintain a current, accurate inventory of all IoT devices and their relevant characteristics throughout the devices' lifecycles in order to use that information for cybersecurity and privacy risk management purposes.
• Vulnerability Management: Identify and eliminate known vulnerabilities in IoT device software and firmware in order to reduce the likelihood and ease of exploitation and compromise. • Access Management: Prevent unauthorized and improper physical and logical access to, usage of, and administration of IoT devices by people, processes, and other computing devices.
• Device Security Incident Detection: Monitor and analyze IoT device activity for signs of incidents involving device security.
Risk mitigation areas for Goal 2, Protect Data Security:
• Data Protection: Prevent access to and tampering with data at rest or in transit that might expose sensitive information or allow manipulation or disruption of IoT device operations.
• Data Security Incident Detection: Monitor and analyze IoT device activity for signs of incidents involving data security.
Risk mitigation areas for Goal 3, Protect Individuals' Privacy:
• Information Flow Management: Maintain a current, accurate mapping of the information lifecycle of PII, including the type of data action, the elements of PII being processed by the data action, the party doing the processing, and any additional relevant contextual factors about the processing to use for privacy risk management purposes.
• PII Processing Permissions Management: Maintain permissions for PII processing to prevent unpermitted PII processing.
• Informed Decision Making: Enable individuals to understand the effects of PII processing and interactions with the device, participate in decision-making about the PII processing or interactions, and resolve problems.
• Disassociated Data Management: Identify authorized PII processing and determine how PII may be minimized or disassociated from individuals and IoT devices.
• Privacy Breach Detection: Monitor and analyze IoT device activity for signs of breaches involving individuals' privacy.
Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 examine how the risk considerations introduce challenges for cybersecurity and privacy risk managers with meeting each of the three risk mitigation goals for an organization's IoT devices-in other words, how mitigation may differ for IoT versus conventional IT. Section 5 provides recommendations on how organizations should address these challenges. Figure 5 shows the relationships among the Section 3 and Section 4 concepts. Section 3 defines the three risk considerations, which explain why and how IoT devices impact the management of cybersecurity and privacy risks. Next, the Section 4 introduction defines the risk mitigation goals and areas, which specify which types of cybersecurity and privacy risks matter for IoT devices and may be most affected by the risk considerations. The rest of Section 4 lists expectations, which are how organizations expect conventional IT devices to help mitigate cybersecurity and privacy risks for the risk mitigation goals and areas, and the challenges IoT devices may pose to those expectations, along with the implications of those challenges. The end result of these linkages is the identification of a structured set of potential challenges for mitigating cybersecurity and privacy risk for IoT devices that can each be traced back to the relevant risk considerations.
Potential Challenges with Achieving Goal 1, Protect Device Security
Many readers may not need to use the information at all the levels of detail depicted in Figure 5 , and some readers may only need the information at one level, such as the list of challenges. This document includes all the levels in order to explain the basis for identifying these particular challenges as being potentially significant for IoT devices. Also, some readers may be able to use all levels to inform their risk management efforts. Table 1 lists common expectations for the pre-market capabilities of conventional IT devices that are often used to help mitigate their device security risk. Although these expectations are not always true for conventional IT devices, they are usually true and have greatly influenced common device security practices for conventional IT devices. For each expectation, Table 1 defines one or more potential challenges individual IoT devices may pose to the expectation. Each challenge has its own row in the table:
• First column: a brief statement of the challenge, with each challenge uniquely numbered to make it easy to reference, and the numbers of the risk considerations from Section 3 that cause the challenge. • Second column: examples of draft NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5 [7] controls that might be negatively affected to some extent for some individual IoT devices.
• Third column: the potential implications for the organization if a substantial number of IoT devices are affected by the challenge.
• Fourth column: examples of Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories [6] that might be negatively affected to some extent by the implications.
The tables in this section do not define or imply equivalence between the NIST SP 800-53 controls and the Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories in each row. For example, in many cases, a challenge affects one aspect of the SP 800-53 controls and a different aspect of the Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories. Additionally, IoT devices not meeting traditional expectations could be a positive for risk mitigation since these limitations could pose less risk than when the more robust capability or function is present as per expectation. The table does not define these considerations, but instead aims to help cybersecurity and privacy risk managers understand how IoT devices may or may not fit into their existing mitigations and/or impact how cybersecurity and privacy outcomes for their organization are currently achieved. Risk Consideration 2
• CM-8, System Component Inventory
• May complicate device management, including remote access and vulnerability management.
• ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems within the organization are inventoried Expectation 2: The device can interface with enterprise asset management systems.
2. The IoT device may not be able to participate in a centralized asset management system.
Risk Consideration 2
• May have to use multiple asset management systems.
• May have to perform asset management tasks manually.
• ID. Risk Consideration 2
• May complicate all aspects of device management and risk management.
• 
Not all of the IoT
device's external dependencies may be revealed.
Risk Consideration 2
• AC-20, Use of External Systems
• Cannot manage risk for the external software and services.
• Risk Consideration 3
• SI-2, Flaw Remediation
• Cannot remove known vulnerabilities.
• PR. Risk Consideration 3
• May not be able to remove known vulnerabilities in the future.
• PR.IP-1: A baseline configuration of information technology/industrial control systems is created and maintained incorporating security principles (e.g. concept of least functionality)
Expectation 6: The device either has its own secure built-in patch, upgrade, and configuration management capabilities, or can interface with enterprise vulnerability management systems with such capabilities.
8. The IoT device may not be capable of having its software patched or upgraded.
Risk Considerations 2 and 3
9. It may be too risky to install patches or upgrades or to make configuration changes without extensive testing and preparation first, and implementing changes may require operational outages or inadvertently cause outages.
Risk Consideration 1
• May be significant delays in removing known vulnerabilities.
• PR. 12. There may not be a vulnerability scanner that can run on or against the IoT device.
Risk Consideration 3
• RA-5, Vulnerability Scanning
• Cannot automatically identify known vulnerabilities.
• DE.CM-8: Vulnerability scans are performed 13. The IoT device may not offer any built-in capabilities to identify and report on known vulnerabilities.
• DE.CM-8: Vulnerability scans are performed
Access Management
Expectation 8: The device can uniquely identify each user, device, and process attempting to logically access it.
14. The IoT device may not support any use of identifiers.
Risk Considerations 2 and 3
• Identification and Authentication
• Cannot identify or authenticate some users, devices, and processes.
• PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users and processes • PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., singlefactor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks) Expectation 9: The device can conceal password characters from display when a person enters a password for a device, such as on a keyboard or touch screen.
The IoT device may
not support concealment of displayed password characters.
Risk Considerations 2 and 3
• IA-6, Authenticator Feedback
• Increases the likelihood of credential theft.
• PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., singlefactor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks)
Expectation 10: The device can authenticate each user, device, and process attempting to logically access it.
18. The IoT device may not support use of non-trivial credentials (e.g., does not support the use of identifiers, does not allow default passwords to be changed).
• IA-5, Authenticator Management
• Cannot identify or authenticate users, devices, and processes, which increases the chances of unauthorized access and tampering.
• Increases the chances of unauthorized access and tampering through credential misuse.
• PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., singlefactor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks) • Need one or more additional accounts and credentials for each user.
• PR. 
Affected Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories
Expectation 14: The device has adequate built-in physical security controls to protect it from tampering (e.g., tamper-resistant packaging).
24. The IoT device may be deployed in an area where people who are not authorized to access the device may do so or where authorized people can access the device in unauthorized ways.
Risk Considerations 1 and 2
• MP-2, Media Access • MP-7, Media Use • PE-3, Physical Access Control
• Allows an attacker to have direct physical access to devices and tamper with them, including adding or removing storage media, connecting peripherals, etc.
• PR.AC-2: Physical access to assets is managed and protected • PR.PT-2: Removable media is protected and its use restricted according to policy • PR.MA-1: Maintenance and repair of organizational assets are performed and logged, with approved and controlled tools
Incident Detection
Expectation 15: The device can log its operational and security events.
25. The IoT device may not be able to log its operational and security events at all or in sufficient detail.
Risk Consideration 3
• AU-2, Audit Events
• Increases the likelihood of malicious activity going undetected.
• Cannot confirm and reconstruct incidents from log entries.
• DE.CM-7: Monitoring for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software is performed • PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy • RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection systems are investigated 26. The IoT device may continue operating even when a logging failure occurs.
• AU-5, Response to Audit Processing Failures
• Increased likelihood of malicious activity going undetected.
• DE.CM-7: Monitoring for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software is performed • PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy Expectation 16: The device can interface with existing enterprise log management systems.
27. The IoT device may not be able to participate in an enterprise log management system.
Risk Consideration 2
• AU-6, Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting • SI-4, System Monitoring
• May have to use numerous log management systems instead of one.
• May have to perform log management tasks manually.
Affected Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories
Expectation 17: The device can facilitate the detection of potential incidents by internal or external controls, such as intrusion prevention systems, anti-malware utilities, and file integrity checking mechanisms.
28. The IoT device may not be able to execute internal detection controls or interact with external detection controls without adversely affecting device operation.
Risk Considerations 1 and 3
• SI-3, Malicious Code Protection • SI-7, Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity
• Increases the likelihood of malicious code infections and other unauthorized activities occurring and going undetected.
• DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events • DE.CM-4: Malicious code is detected • PR.DS-6: Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity 29. The IoT device may not provide controls with the visibility needed to detect incidents efficiently and effectively.
Risk Considerations 2 and 3
• IR-4, Incident Handling • SI-4, System Monitoring
• Increases the likelihood of malicious code and other unauthorized activities going undetected.
• DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events • DE.CM-4: Malicious code is detected • PR.DS-6: Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity Expectation 18: The device can support event and incident analysis activities.
30. The IoT device may not provide analysts with sufficient access to the device's resources in order to do the necessary analysis.
Risk Considerations 2 and 3
• SI-4, System Monitoring
• Cannot use forensic tools for information gathering and analysis.
• RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection systems are investigated • RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed Table 2 follows the same conventions as Table 1 , but for protecting data security. It is assumed that if data security needs to be protected, device security needs protection as well, so the challenges in both tables would need to be considered.
Potential Challenges with Achieving Goal 2, Protect Data Security
Note that the Incident Detection section of Table 1 is also applicable for protecting data security. Table 1 assumes only device security incidents need to be protected; the same potential challenges, affected controls, implications, and Cybersecurity Framework subcategories also apply to detecting data security incidents. The Incident Detection rows are omitted from Table 2 for brevity.
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8228 • Increases the likelihood of unauthorized access to or tampering with sensitive data.
• PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is protected • PR.PT-2: Removable media is protected and its use restricted according to policy 32. The IoT device may not provide a mechanism for sanitizing sensitive data before disposing of or repurposing the device.
Risk Consideration 3
• MP-6, Media Sanitization
• Increases the likelihood of unauthorized access to sensitive data.
• PR.IP-6: Data is destroyed according to policy
Expectation 20: The device has a mechanism to support data availability through secure backups.
33. The IoT device may not provide a secure backup and restore mechanism for its data.
• CP-9, System Backup
• Increases the likelihood of loss of data.
• PR.IP-4: Backups of information are conducted, maintained, and tested
Expectation 21: The device can prevent unauthorized access to all sensitive data transmitted from it over networks.
34. The IoT device may not provide sufficiently strong encryption capabilities for protecting sensitive data sent in its network communications.
• AC-18, Wireless Access • SC-8, Transmission
Confidentiality and Integrity
• Increases the likelihood of eavesdropping on communications.
• PR.DS-2: Data-intransit is protected 35. The IoT device may not verify the identity of another computing device before sending sensitive data in its network communications.
• SC-8, Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity • SC-23, Session Authenticity
• Increases the likelihood of eavesdropping, interception, manipulation, impersonation, and other forms of attack on communications.
• PR.DS-2: Data-intransit is protected Table 3 lists potential challenges with achieving goal 3, protecting individuals' privacy by mitigating privacy risk arising from authorized PII processing. It follows the same conventions as the previous tables, but it omits mappings to Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories since the Cybersecurity Framework does not address privacy risks from authorized PII processing. It is assumed that if individuals' privacy needs to be protected, device and data security need to be protected as well, so the challenges in all three tables would need to be considered. However, organizations may use information from Table 2 to address privacy risks arising from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of PII.
Potential Challenges with Achieving Goal 3, Protect Individuals' Privacy
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SI-20, DeIdentification
• Aggregation of disparate data sets may lead to re-identification of PII.
Recommendations for Addressing Cybersecurity and Privacy Risk Mitigation Challenges for IoT Devices
This section provides recommendations for addressing the cybersecurity and privacy risk mitigation challenges for IoT devices. Figure 6 summarizes the recommendations, which are listed below and, if indicated, described in more detail elsewhere in the publication:
1. Understand the IoT device risk considerations (Section 3) and the challenges they may cause to mitigating cybersecurity and privacy risks for IoT devices in the appropriate risk mitigation areas (Section 4).
2. Adjust organizational policies and processes to address the cybersecurity and privacy risk mitigation challenges throughout the IoT device lifecycle. Section 5.1 provides more information on this. Section 4 of this publication cites many examples of possible challenges, but each organization will need to customize these to take into account mission requirements and other organization-specific characteristics.
3. Implement updated mitigation practices for the organization's IoT devices as you would any other changes to practices (Section 5.2).
Adjusting Organizational Policies and Processes
Organizations should ensure they are addressing the considerations throughout the IoT device lifecycle in their cybersecurity and privacy policies and processes. Organizations should ensure they clearly state how they scope IoT in order to avoid confusion and ambiguity. This is particularly important for organizations that may be subject to laws and regulations with differing definitions of IoT.
Similarly, organizations should ensure their cybersecurity, supply chain, and privacy risk management programs take IoT into account appropriately. This includes the following:
• Determining which devices have IoT device capabilities. Have mechanisms in place to determine whether a device that might be procured or has already been procured is an IoT device, if that is not apparent.
• Identifying IoT device types. Know which types of IoT devices are in use, which capabilities each type supports, and what purposes each type supports. • Assessing IoT device risk. It is important to take into consideration the particular IoT environment the IoT devices reside within, and not just assess risks for IoT devices in isolation. For example, attaching an actuator to one physical system may affect risks much differently than attaching the same actuator to another physical system.
• Determining how to respond to that risk by accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring it. As previously discussed, some risk mitigation strategies for conventional IT may not work well for IoT. Section 4 of this publication discusses risk mitigation challenges for IoT devices in considerable detail.
Managing cybersecurity and privacy risks for some IoT devices may affect other types of risks and introduce new risks to safety, reliability, resiliency, performance, and other areas. Organizations should be sure to consider the tradeoffs among these risks when making decisions about cybersecurity and privacy risk mitigation. For example, suppose a particular IoT device is critical for safety. Requiring personnel in a physically secured area to enter a password in order to gain local access to the IoT device could delay intervention during a malfunction. Additional requirements involving password length, password complexity, and automatic account lockouts after consecutive failed authentication attempts could cause far longer delays, increasing the likelihood and magnitude of harm. Organizations should leverage their existing programs for managing other forms of risk when determining how IoT device cybersecurity and privacy risks should be managed.
Based on the potential mitigation challenges and the implications of those challenges, the implementations of the following Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories [6] are most likely to need adjustments so the organizational policies and processes adequately address cybersecurity risk throughout the IoT device lifecycle:
• Similarly, the implementations of the tasks listed below from NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2 [4] are most likely to need adjusted so the organizational policies and processes adequately address cybersecurity and privacy risk throughout the IoT device lifecycle. Note that although the Cybersecurity Framework can be used to manage the aspect of privacy relating to PII cybersecurity, NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2 can be used to manage the full scope of privacy because it integrates authorized PII processing into the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF).
• Prepare, Organization Level, Task P-1: Risk Management Roles
• Prepare, Organization Level, Task P-2: Risk Management Strategy
• Prepare, Organization Level, Task P-3: Risk Assessment-Organization
• Prepare, System Level, Task P-8: Mission or Business Focus
• Prepare, System Level, Task P-13: Information Life Cycle
• Prepare, System Level, Task P-14: Risk Assessment-System
• Prepare, System Level, Task P-15: Requirements Definition
Implementing Updated Risk Mitigation Practices
An organization's cybersecurity and privacy risk mitigation practices may need significant changes because of the sheer number of IoT devices and the large number of IoT device types. For conventional IT devices, most organizations have dozens of types-desktops, laptops, servers, smartphones, routers, switches, firewalls, printers, etc. Conventional IT devices within a single type tend to have similar capabilities. For example, most laptops have similar data storage and processing capabilities; human user interface and network interface capabilities; and supporting capabilities, such as centralized management. This enables organizations to determine how to manage risk for each of the dozens of conventional IT device types, with some customizations for particular devices and device models, and organizations are generally accustomed to this level of effort.
In contrast, most organizations may have many more types of IoT devices than conventional IT devices because of the single-purpose nature of most IoT devices. An organization may need to determine how to manage risk for hundreds or thousands of IoT device types. Capabilities vary widely from one IoT device type to another, with one type lacking data storage and centralized management capabilities, and another type having numerous sensors and actuators, using local and remote data storage and processing capabilities, and being connected to several internal and external networks at once. The variability in capabilities causes similar variability in the cybersecurity and privacy risks involving each IoT device type, as well as the options for mitigating those risks.
In addition, an organization may need to determine how to manage risk not just by device type, but also by device usage. The way a device is to be used may indicate that one security objective, such as integrity, is more important than another, such as confidentiality, and that in turn may necessitate different mechanisms to risk mitigation. Similarly, a device might be used in such a way that some of its capabilities are not needed and can be disabled, which could reduce the device's risk.
Risk "A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact, or magnitude of harm, that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence." [4] Sensing Capability The ability to provide an observation of an aspect of the physical world in the form of measurement data.
Supporting Capabilities
Capabilities that provide functionality that supports the other IoT capabilities. Examples of supporting capabilities are device management, cybersecurity, and privacy capabilities.
Transducer Capabilities Capabilities that provide the ability for computing devices to interact directly with physical entities of interest. The two types of transducer capabilities are sensing and actuating.
